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Better preparedness for an inﬂ   uenza pandemic miti-
gates its impact. Many countries have started developing 
and implementing national inﬂ   uenza pandemic prepared-
ness plans. However, the level of preparedness varies 
among countries. Developing countries encounter unique 
and difﬁ  cult issues and challenges in preparing for a pan-
demic. Deaths attributable to an inﬂ  uenza pandemic could 
be substantially higher in developing countries than in in-
dustrialized countries. Pharmaceutical interventions such 
as vaccines and antiviral agents are less likely to be avail-
able in developing countries. The public health and clinical 
infrastructure of developing countries are often inadequate 
to deal with a widespread health crisis such as an inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic. Such an event will inevitably have a global ef-
fect. Therefore, improving pandemic preparedness in every 
country, particularly developing ones, is urgently needed.
A
vian inﬂ  uenza, caused by inﬂ  uenza A virus (H5N1), 
continues to cause outbreaks among poultry and wild 
birds worldwide. It has spread from Asia to other regions, 
including Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The num-
ber of cases of human subtype H5N1 infection also con-
tinues to rise. These historically unprecedented outbreaks 
have raised serious global concerns about the imminent 
arrival of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic. The World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) urges countries to develop and imple-
ment national pandemic preparedness plans to mitigate the 
health and social effects of a pandemic (1). However, the 
level of preparedness varies among countries. In general, 
developing countries have limited ﬁ  nancial and technical 
resources to strengthen pandemic preparedness. They also 
face some unique and difﬁ  cult issues, which make prepar-
ing for a pandemic more challenging. These have not been 
addressed adequately during planning. Effective and fea-
sible strategies are needed to mitigate the impact of the next 
inﬂ  uenza pandemic in developing countries.
Major Issues
Potential Impact of Next Inﬂ  uenza Pandemic 
in Developing Countries
When an inﬂ  uenza pandemic emerges, all countries 
worldwide will inevitably be affected. However, the im-
pact may vary both between and within countries. The es-
timated deaths for various countries during the Spanish ﬂ  u 
pandemic from 1918 to 1920 shows that mortality rates in 
Europe and North America were signiﬁ  cantly lower than 
those in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America 
(2,3). A recent study that estimated the global impact of 
the Spanish ﬂ  u pandemic indicated that a considerable dif-
ference in mortality rates was observed between high- and 
low-income countries (4). Why the pandemic caused such 
high mortality rates in developing countries is not entirely 
clear. Several factors may have been involved, including 
lack of access to adequate medical care, weak public health 
infrastructures, social factors such as housing conditions 
and population density, and host factors such as nutri-
tional status and co-existing medical conditions. Another 
potential factor likely to inﬂ  uence mortality in a future 
pandemic is the high HIV/AIDS prevalence in some devel-
oping countries. Excess deaths attributed to pneumonia or 
inﬂ  uenza are signiﬁ  cantly higher in HIV-positive persons 
during inﬂ  uenza seasons (5). HIV co-infection with a pan-
demic virus can be associated with more severe infections, 
which may further raise death rates in countries with high 
HIV/AIDS prevalence.
For these reasons, deaths associated with a future 
pandemic may be greater in developing countries than in 
industrialized countries. One study concluded that 96% of 
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the estimated 62 million deaths in a future pandemic would 
occur in developing countries (4). The impact of such high 
mortality rates obviously needs to be taken into account 
when creating pandemic preparedness plans for developing 
countries. However, no appropriate model that can estimate 
the impact of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic in developing coun-
tries exists. Models are based on data from industrialized 
countries (6), which may underestimate the actual impact 
of a pandemic in developing countries.
Availability of Vaccines and Antiviral 
Agents in Developing Countries 
Several possible interventions can be implemented to 
control or mitigate the effects of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic, 
which include pharmaceutical interventions such as vac-
cines and antiviral agents, and nonpharmaceutical inter-
ventions such as quarantine, isolation, social distancing, 
and personal hygiene (7). Pharmaceutical interventions are 
needed for mitigating the impact of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic 
(8). Vaccines for subtype H5N1 viruses are currently being 
developed, and clinical trials are under way (9,10). Howev-
er, worldwide vaccine production capacity is limited and is 
primarily in industrialized countries, where most seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza vaccine is produced (11). A recent WHO report 
estimated that the worldwide vaccine production capac-
ity for current inﬂ  uenza vaccines is 350 million doses per 
year (12). That level of production is clearly insufﬁ  cient to 
supply vaccines to all countries. Only a limited number of 
vaccine doses would be available, particularly in the early 
stages of the pandemic, and most of them would likely be 
supplied to industrialized countries. Many countries, espe-
cially developing countries, will be forced to confront the 
next pandemic with few or no available vaccines.
Antiviral agents are also considered effective for an 
inﬂ   uenza pandemic. They are particularly useful in the 
early stages of a pandemic when there is a shortage of vac-
cines (13). Two groups of antiviral agents for inﬂ  uenza are 
currently available, including M2 ion-channel inhibitors 
(amantadine and rimantadine) and neuraminidase inhibi-
tors (oseltamivir and zanamivir). Neuraminidase inhibitors 
are preferred because some inﬂ  uenza viruses show high 
frequencies of resistance to M2 ion-channel inhibitors (14). 
Stockpiling of neuraminidase inhibitors is under way in 
many industrialized countries as part of national inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic preparedness (15). However, the stockpiles of 
antiviral agents available in developing countries are small 
and limited. WHO has global and regional stockpiles of an-
tiviral agents, which are limited and are speciﬁ  cally used 
for early response and containment. The stockpile of anti-
viral agents is insufﬁ  cient for a global pandemic.
The most critical limiting factor for stockpiling of 
neuraminidase inhibitors in developing countries is their 
high cost. One treatment course of oseltamivir (i.e., 10 tab-
lets) costs US $15, even at a discount rate (16), which is 
far too expensive for developing countries. Some industri-
alized countries have set a target to stockpile oseltamivir 
to treat 25% of the general population. To purchase ad-
equate oseltamivir for 25% of the total population, only 
0.11% of the total annual health expenditure is required in 
high-income countries. In low-income countries, however, 
the expense would be 12.9% of the annual expenditure 
(Table 1). Therefore, it is not feasible for low-income 
countries to allocate scarce resources to stockpile sufﬁ  cient 
quantities of oseltamivir for an unpredictable inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic.
Limitations of Pharmaceutical Interventions
The recent efforts to increase global availability of vac-
cines and antiviral agents can contribute to increasing the 
global availability of these pharmaceutical interventions. 
However, increased availability alone will not solve all the 
problems in many countries. Several other issues need to 
be addressed to implement pharmaceutical interventions. 
These pharmaceutical commodities, including syringes and 
needles for vaccines, should be delivered to healthcare fa-
cilities throughout the country. That is a difﬁ  cult logistic 
challenge for many developing countries. Human resourc-
es are also required to implement these interventions. Yet, 
there are some uncertainties about the effectiveness of these 
pharmaceutical interventions. Even neuraminidase inhibi-
tors may not be fully effective for a pandemic virus, whose 
pathogenesis in human hosts differs from that of seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza viruses. Another potential problem with the an-
tiviral drugs is the risk that resistant strains will emerge. 
Vaccines may not be effective because of antigenic differ-
ences between a vaccine strain and a pandemic virus, or for 
other reasons. Full-scale implementation of pharmaceuti-
cal interventions that requires enormous ﬁ  nancial and hu-
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Table 1. Cost of purchasing oseltamivir to cover 25% of population with regard to total health expenditure in countries with different 
economic status* 
Category of country  Average GNP, per capita† 
Average annual health 
expenditure, per capita† 
Cost of 1 treatment course of oseltamivir, 
% annual health expenditure 
High income  30,168 3,376 0.11
Upper middle income  4,310 280 1.34
Lower middle income  1,364 77 4.87
Low income  753 29 12.93
*Data obtained from World Health Organization website (www.who.int/nha). GNP, gross national product. 
†In US$. Pandemic Preparedness in Developing Countries
man resources may not be the best use of limited resources 
in developing countries. The governments, international 
organizations such as WHO, and donors should consider 
various factors when providing support for pharmaceuti-
cal interventions in developing countries. Maintaining a 
balance between pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical 
interventions is necessary to achieve the best use of limited 
resources.
Lack of Medical and Public Health Infrastructure 
to Cope with an Inﬂ  uenza Pandemic
During an inﬂ  uenza pandemic, morbidity and mortal-
ity may be extremely high. Healthcare facilities would be 
quickly overwhelmed with increased numbers of patients. 
In the United States alone, an estimated 18–42 million out-
patient visits and 314,000–734,000 hospitalizations could 
occur (6). The surge capacity in healthcare systems will 
likely be insufﬁ  cient to cope with this rise in patient num-
bers, even in industrialized countries (17,18). Healthcare 
resources such as the number of physicians, nurses, and 
available hospital beds are limited in developing countries. 
In some countries, resources are insufﬁ  cient to cope with 
patients even during normal circumstances. Hospitals and 
clinics in developing countries will be easily overwhelmed 
by the increasing number of patients during an inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic.
Using the method described by Wilson et al. (19), we 
estimated the number of required hospital admissions for 
countries of varying economic status. The percentages of 
available hospital beds occupied by inﬂ  uenza patients at 
incidence rates of 15% and 35% were calculated by us-
ing FluSurge software, version 2.0 (20). Demographic 
data were obtained from the US Census Bureau website 
(www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb) and information related to 
the number of available beds was obtained from a WHO 
database (WHOSIS, www.who.int/whosis/en). Results are 
shown in Table 2. The percentage of hospital beds required 
for patients with pandemic inﬂ  uenza is much higher in low-
income countries than in high-income countries. With an 
incidence rate of 35%, up to 79.1% of hospital beds are re-
quired for patients with pandemic inﬂ  uenza in low-income 
countries. In countries like Bangladesh and Nepal, >100% 
of beds would be required for patients with pandemic inﬂ  u-
enza, even at the incidence rate of 15% (data not shown). 
This model is based on data from the United States, and the 
difference in disease severity among the countries was not 
considered. This model may underestimate the hospital bed 
requirements in developing countries, where a pandemic 
virus may cause more severe infections. Some hospitalized 
patients will require mechanical ventilation (17), but few 
mechanical ventilators, if any, are available in many hospi-
tals in developing countries.
During an inﬂ   uenza pandemic, additional essential 
medical supplies such as gloves, masks, syringes, anti-
pyretics, and antimicrobial agents will also be required. 
These supplies are insufﬁ  cient in healthcare facilities in 
developing countries, even in nonemergency situations. 
Lack of these supplies may hamper provision of adequate 
medical care for patients with pandemic inﬂ  uenza. Basic 
personal protective equipment such as disposable gloves 
and surgical masks are needed for protecting healthcare 
workers. Antimicrobial agents are expected to be effective 
for secondary bacterial pneumonia, which can be a major 
cause of death for patients with pandemic inﬂ  uenza (21). 
Therefore, proper treatment with antimicrobial agents can 
be crucial for preventing deaths. However, in some devel-
oping countries, sufﬁ  cient stocks of essential drugs, includ-
ing antimicrobial agents, are often unavailable.
In countries with limited healthcare resources, provid-
ing routine medical care for other conditions may become 
difﬁ  cult during a pandemic. For example, the treatment for 
tuberculosis or the antiretroviral treatment for AIDS pa-
tients may not be provided because of disruption in health-
care systems. Maintaining other public health programs, 
such as vaccination, may also be difﬁ  cult when most of 
public health resources are spent for the response to a pan-
demic.
Future Directions
Improving Planning Process
To minimize the impact of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic, 
good preparedness plans need to be developed. With the 
increasing risk for a pandemic caused by the spread of in-
ﬂ  uenza A virus (H5N1), most countries have started such 
planning. These national plans were recently reviewed 
from different perspectives (15,22–24). The level of plan-
ning in many developing countries is still inadequate to 
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Table 2. Hospital bed requirements during an influenza pandemic in countries with different economic status* 
Mean no. hospital beds required, as % of available 
hospital beds (range) 
Category of country 
Mean no. hospital beds/1,000 
population (range)  15% Incidence rate  35% Incidence rate 
High income (N = 38 per capita)  50.7 (21–196)  8.9 (2.2–15.5)  20.8 (5.2–35.7) 
Upper middle income (N = 28 per capita)  45.1 (9–99)  10.6 (3.9–30.1)  24.8 (9.0–70.3) 
Lower middle income (N = 46 per capita)  30.0 (5–112)  15.5 (2.4–50.0)  36.2 (5.7–116) 
Low income (N = 19 per capita)  26.2 (1.5–132)  33.9 (2.5–164)  79.1 (5.9–383) 
*Only those countries with data on hospital beds and that were included in the World Bank country classification were included in the analyses. African 
countries are not incorporated in the analyses because they have no hospital bed data. PERSPECTIVE
deal with such a major public health crisis. Some plans are 
based on the available plans of industrialized countries, or 
follow similar approaches to those of industrialized coun-
tries. As described above, the approaches used by indus-
trialized countries may not be feasible or appropriate for 
developing countries. In addition, each country has speciﬁ  c 
issues, and therefore it should develop a plan based on its 
own requirements. This task can be difﬁ  cult for most de-
veloping countries because they have little or no expertise 
with inﬂ  uenza and pandemic preparedness. For the few in-
fectious disease experts working on infectious diseases in 
each country, numerous competing priorities exist, such as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and vaccine-preventable 
diseases. Feasible, user-friendly tools are needed to assist 
these countries. WHO has developed several such tools, 
including a checklist for national preparedness (25). How-
ever, these tools describe the general approaches to pan-
demic preparedness and are not speciﬁ  cally designed for 
countries with limited resources. For developing countries 
more practical tools are needed, among them models to es-
timate the impact of a pandemic in developing countries, a 
list of feasible interventions to mitigate the impact of pan-
demic without available pharmaceutical interventions, and 
planning guidelines for hospitals with limited resources.
Increasing Availability of Antiviral 
Agents and Vaccines
If the next pandemic occurs in a few years, vaccines 
and antiviral agents, particularly neuraminidase inhibitors, 
may not be available as a main intervention in developing 
countries. Availability needs to be increased to ﬁ  ll the gaps 
between developed and industrialized countries. WHO rec-
ommends an increase in worldwide vaccine production to 
meet the demand during a pandemic (12). Several coun-
tries have initiated projects to improve inﬂ  uenza vaccine 
production with technical and ﬁ  nancial support from WHO 
and donors. However, improved vaccine production capac-
ity is not sustainable if only used for pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
vaccines. The use of seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccines would also 
need to increase in these countries. However, the cost of the 
vaccines (US $3–$7 per dose) is a barrier in increasing their 
use (12). There is also little available evidence on the ef-
fectiveness and cost beneﬁ  ts of seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccines 
in tropical developing countries. Further efforts should be 
made to reduce the cost and to collect additional scientiﬁ  c 
data to increase the use of seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccines.
Some approaches have been proposed and tested to 
reduce the amount of antigens per vaccine dose for pan-
demic vaccine so that more vaccines, including adjuvant 
and whole virion vaccines, can be supplied (10). The world 
is expected to have an increased capacity to produce vac-
cines for pandemic inﬂ  uenza viruses by 2010 (12). In some 
countries, the vaccines for the subtype with a pandemic po-
tential are being produced and stockpiled as a prepandemic 
vaccine, which can be a useful tool to mitigate the impact 
of a pandemic (26). However, both pandemic and prepan-
demic vaccines would not be available in developing coun-
tries unless an international mechanism exists to share such 
vaccines with them at a low cost.
Some actions have also been taken to reduce the cost 
of neuraminidase inhibitors such as oseltamivir. It is being 
produced in sublicensing companies in developing coun-
tries to increase its supply at a lower cost. However, oselta-
mivir may still not be affordable for many developing coun-
tries. In industrialized countries, M2 ion-channel inhibitors 
are not considered a ﬁ  rst choice of treatment because of 
the high rate of resistance to these inhibitors. However, 
amantadine is much cheaper than neuraminidase inhibitors 
and is more widely available. Most subtype H5N1 isolates 
that belong to clade 1 are resistant to amantadine, but many 
clade 2 viruses are still susceptible to amantadine (27). M2 
ion-channel inhibitors can be a valid option for a pandemic, 
especially in developing countries (28). The value of M2 
ion-channel inhibitors as a treatment option for an inﬂ  u-
enza pandemic should be evaluated further.
Providing Better Medical Care
The health consequences of a pandemic, including 
deaths, can be substantially reduced by providing better 
medical care. Several issues need to be addressed to pro-
vide adequate medical care during a pandemic. First, es-
sential medical supplies such as masks, gloves, and antimi-
crobial agents should be available in hospitals and clinics. 
The stockpiles of these basic supplies can be more cost-ef-
fective in developing countries than the stockpiles of more 
expensive antiviral agents. Guidelines on the types and 
quantity of essential items that are required in hospitals and 
clinics should be developed. Second, healthcare personnel 
should be trained for infection control measures. Even sur-
gical masks are not commonly used in many developing 
countries, and hand hygiene practices are not always fol-
lowed. Basic training on infection control should be pro-
vided to improve pandemic preparedness in healthcare set-
tings. Third, healthcare and public health systems need to 
be maintained to minimize the impact of a pandemic. These 
systems should be maintained to deal not only with a pan-
demic but also with other health problems such as malaria, 
tuberculosis, and HIV.
Developing Feasible Mitigation Strategies
More feasible and effective strategies should be devel-
oped as soon as possible to mitigate the negative impact 
of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic in developing countries. Since 
the availability of pharmaceutical interventions in devel-
oping countries is less likely, nonpharmaceutical interven-
tions such as social distancing and personal hygiene may 
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be the only available interventions. Public health measures 
such as school closure and household quarantine have been 
evaluated by using mathematical models for their effective-
ness in mitigating the impact of a pandemic (29,30) and 
may have potential beneﬁ  cial effects. However, the models 
suggest that substantial beneﬁ  ts of these measures require 
implementation with antiviral prophylaxis or vaccines 
(29,30). The evidence for effectiveness of public health 
measures is limited and is based primarily on experience in 
industrialized countries (31,32). For example, handwash-
ing and hand hygiene have been highly publicized as a core 
management strategy for avian and pandemic inﬂ  uenza in 
developing countries (33). Although handwashing is effec-
tive in reducing the incidence of common diseases such as 
acute respiratory infections (34), data on its effectiveness 
speciﬁ  cally for community-acquired inﬂ  uenza infections 
are limited (31). Recommendations on nonpharmaceutical 
interventions have been based on available evidence (35). 
Accumulation of further scientiﬁ  c evidence for these mea-
sures, which can be implemented at a low cost, is urgently 
required.
Strengthening Core Capacities
Many health programs in developing countries depend 
on ﬁ  nancial support from donors. Inﬂ  uenza had little donor 
interest before the current avian inﬂ  uenza outbreaks. More 
donor funds are available for avian and pandemic inﬂ  uen-
za. These funds are often earmarked for speciﬁ  c activities. 
However, a more general approach is required to improve 
pandemic preparedness in developing countries. Improv-
ing pandemic preparedness without establishing a proper 
national program for seasonal inﬂ  uenza is unrealistic. For 
example, increasing the availability of pandemic vaccines 
without increasing the use of vaccines for seasonal inﬂ  u-
enza is difﬁ  cult. It is also difﬁ  cult to implement infection 
control measures in hospitals and personal hygiene during 
a pandemic if they are not routinely implemented for sea-
sonal inﬂ  uenza and other infections.
Lack of adequate infrastructure and technical expertise 
is a fundamental issue for developing countries, not only 
for inﬂ  uenza pandemic preparedness but also for any other 
infectious disease threats. Revised International Health 
Regulations (2005) were adopted at the World Health As-
sembly in 2005, under which each country is required to 
have core capacities for disease surveillance and response 
(36). Strengthening the core capacity in each country 
should be an essential step to improve preparedness for any 
public health emergency, including an inﬂ  uenza pandemic. 
Although some actions should be taken immediately to ad-
dress urgent issues regarding a pandemic threat posed by 
inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1), a long-term vision is required to es-
tablish such core capacity in every country.
Strengthening International Collaboration
An inﬂ  uenza pandemic will spread to every corner of 
the world; hence, every country must be prepared for such 
a global event. All human cases of infection with inﬂ  uenza 
A virus (H5N1) have so far occurred in less industrialized 
countries, and thus the pandemic virus is likely to emerge 
from these countries. Epidemiologic models have indicated 
the possibility of rapid containment of the virus with a pan-
demic potential (37,38). WHO has stockpiles of oseltami-
vir speciﬁ  cally for the early containment of a potential pan-
demic. However, the window of opportunity is narrow, and 
early containment operations should be initiated as soon as 
the initial sign of a potential pandemic is detected. Timely 
sharing of the virus strains and relevant information is es-
sential for such containment to be successful. 
Sharing of the virus stains is also critical to develop 
pandemic vaccines. However, some countries do not share 
the virus strains with WHO reference laboratories. These 
countries argue that the virus strains from their countries 
would be used to develop pandemic vaccines that would 
only be available for rich countries (39). Developing coun-
tries have no incentives to share the virus strains if they do 
not beneﬁ  t from the vaccines developed from these strains. 
The gaps in resources, including vaccine production capac-
ity between the developing and industrialized countries, 
hinder the global effort to respond to a pandemic. Unequal 
distribution of resources, including antiviral stockpiles, 
could also be a major international issue when an inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic occurs. Countries with limited or no antiviral 
stockpiles and other resources may not be able to cope with 
the pandemic. A pandemic poses a serious threat to global 
health security if large gaps in capacity and available re-
sources continue to persist. Large numbers of people may 
attempt to cross international borders to obtain better medi-
cal care, including antiviral treatment, or to escape a cha-
otic situation. Preparing for a pandemic by simply strength-
ening preparedness within a single country is not possible. 
A pandemic is a global issue, and pandemic preparedness 
should be considered from a global perspective.
Dr Oshitani is a professor in the Department of Virology, 
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